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COMMENTS
MAXIMUM UTILIZATION COLLIDES WITH PRIOR
APPROPRIATION IN A-B CATTLE CO. V UNITED
STA TES
I. INTRODUCTION
The right of a water appropriator in Colorado to receive water of a
quality that will not significantly impair his historic use has been recognized
by Colorado courts since the adoption of the appropriation doctrine.' The
duty of a water appropriator in Colorado to apply the water he receives to a
beneficial use also dates from the beginning of the appropriation doctrine.
2
Implicit in the requirement of beneficial use is the recently articulated con-
cept of maximum utilization, 3-that water application produce the highest
benefit for the greatest number of people.
4
A perhaps inevitable clash between the doctrines of prior appropriation
and maximum utilization occurred in A-B Cattle Co. v. United Slates.5 This
comment will trace the histories of water quality as an aspect of prior appro-
priation and maximum utilization as an outgrowth of beneficial use, analyze
the reasoning of the decision in the instant case, and discuss its impact on
Colorado water law.
II. FACTS OF A-B CATTLE Co. V. UNITED STATES
On June 11, 1969, the United States Bureau of Reclamation instituted
condemnation proceedings in the Denver Federal District Court for the
headgate and upper segment of a diversion ditch owned by the Bessemer
Irrigating Ditch Company (Bessemer). 6 The condemnation action was in
relation to the construction of Pueblo Dam on the Arkansas River in south-
eastern Colorado, as part of the Fryingpan-Arkansas Reclamation Project.
7
Bessemer responded with a claim for damages exceeding $ 100,000,000, alleg-
ing construction of the dam would impound the silt normally occurring in
the Arkansas River. It was claimed that the delivery of clear water rather
1. Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People, 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794 (1886). Accord, Rocky
Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 216, 140 P.2d 638 (1943); Arizona
Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 12 Ariz. 190, 100 P. 465 (1909), aft'd, 230 U.S. 46 (1913); Hill v. King, 8
Cal. 336 (1857).
2. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
3. Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
4. Trelease, Policiesfor Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and Pub/i Regulation, 5
NAT. RES. J. 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Trelease].
5. 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1978).
6. United States v. 508.88 Acres of Land, No. C-1480 (D. Colo., filed June 1I, 1969).
Bessemer is a non-profit, mutual ditch company whose operating expenses are shared by its
shareholders on a pro rata basis. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-42-101 to -109 (1973). See also
Jacobucci v. District Court, 189 Colo. 380, 541 P.2d 667 (1975).
7. 43 U.S.C. §§ 616a-f (1976).
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than silt-laden water to Bessemer would: (1) aggravate seepage loss through
the sides of the ditch, which the silt had formerly sealed; (2) allow the growth
of aquatic plants in the ditch, increasing maintenance expense; and (3) cause
the water to settle more rapidly in irrigating ditches than the same amount
of silt-laden water, cutting down the amount of acreage which could be irri-
gated.8
According to Bessemer, each of these consequences interfered with the
use to which its stockholders had historically applied their water appropria-
tion. Under Colorado law, an interference in decreed water rights is a le-
gally-compensable taking of property, 9 and the United States was therefore
liable to Bessemer for inverse condemnation. 1o
The United States moved to strike Bessemer's response, but Federal Dis-
trict Judge Arraj upheld Bessemer's claim that the loss of silt was a taking of
property under Colorado law." Bessemer subsequently shifted its claim to
the United States Court of Claims under the name of one of its stockholders,
A-B Cattle Company. Judge Arraj then removed his opinion so that all Bes-
semer's rights could be adjudicated by one court. 1 2 The Court of Claims
certified the question of Bessemer's right to silt to the Colorado Supreme
Court, determining that the question involved an interpretation of Colorado
law. 13
On August 21, 1978, the Colorado Supreme Court, in a four to three
decision, held that Bessemer did have a right to a continuation of conditions
formerly occurring in the Arkansas, including silt.' 4 After granting a peti-
tion for rehearing by the United States and amicus Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District (SEWCD), the court reversed its earlier decision
by another four to three vote, with Justice Kelly changing his vote.' 5 Justice
Erickson, joined by Justices Lee and Carrigan, dissented. '
6
III. WATER QUALITY AS AN ASPECT OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION
The purpose of the prior appropriation doctrine in Colorado water law
is to protect a senior appropriator's right to a specific quantity of water.'
7
The right to use water, therefore, has been elevated to a property right.18 As
such, it gives a senior appropriator the power to have an upstream junior
appropriator's use cut off, if the senior is not receiving the full amount of his
8. Brief for Plaintiff Bessemer at 2-3.
9. Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976).
11. United States v. 508.88 Acres of Land, No. C-1480 (D. Colo., Opinion of May 8, 1973).
12. Id. (D. Colo., June 18, 1976).
13. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14. 7 COLO. LAW. 1873 (1978).
15. 589 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1978).
16. Id. at 62.
17. See generally C. MEYERS, A HISTORICAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE APPRO-
PRIATION SYSTEM, National Water Commission Legal Study No. 1 (July 1, 1971). Ste also Note,
A Surve of Colorado Water Law, 47 DEN. L.J. 226 (1970).
18. Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962);
Sherwood Irrigation Co. v. Vandewark, 138 Colo. 261, 331 P.2d 810 (1958); Strickler v. City of
Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313 (1891).
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decreed right.' 9 He may also demand compensation from a governmental
body which condemns his senior right.20 The policy underlying this doctrine
has been to encourage the beneficial application of water to an arid geo-
graphic region, dependent on water diversion for economic productivity. 2'
By protecting a prior appropriator's right to a specific quantity of water,
there is an assurance that his expenditure of time, effort, and money will not
be wasted because of a later upstream diversion.
Under the same reasoning, and provided with the same remedies of en-
joinment and compensation, a prior appropriator has been guaranteed a
continuation in the quality of water existing in a stream at the time of his
appropriation. 22 A significant deterioration in quality can impair an appro-
priator's use to the same extent as a diminution in quantity.
23
The earliest Colorado case addressing the issue of quality was Lari'mer
County Reservoir Co. v. People.24 It involved, as does the instant case, the con-
struction of an onstream reservoir by a junior appropriator. Though the
court upheld the junior's right to store the water, it conditioned the storage
right on the prevention of any impairment of water quantity or quality that
would injure downstream senior appropriators. If downstream use had been
hampered by a deterioration in water quality, the junior appropriator would
have been held liable.
25
The specific quality of water to which an appropriator is entitled has
never been adequately defined by Colorado courts or statutes. Most of the
quality cases have involved a discharge of pollutants, e.g. mill tailings, 26 but
the definition of quality has never been limited to a simple absence of pollu-
tants.
Two aspects of the kind of water quality protected by the appropriation
doctrine have been enunciated and followed by Colorado courts. One is that
there can be no impairment of the use an appropriator has made of the
19. City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
20. Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908); Arm-
strong v. Larimer County Ditch Co., 1 Colo. App. 49, 27 P. 235 (1891).
21. See note 17 supra.
22. "[The senior appropriator's right] is to have the natural waters and all accretions come
down the natural channel undiminished in quality as well as quantity." Humphreys Tunnel &
Mining Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 524, 532, 105 P. 1093, 1096 (1909).
23. 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, 448
(1971).
Qualty of the Water. (1) As a general principle, the appropriator is entitled to the flow
of water in the stream to his diversion works in such a state of natural purity as to
substantially fulfill the use for which his appropriation was made. If not protected in
this particular, the usefulness of his water right may be depreciated or even be de-
stroyed. The necessity for the rule is self-evident.
d See Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 96 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024 (1934).
24. 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794 (1885).
25. But the privilege [to store water] so recognized is, of course, qualified by the condi-
tion that no injury to others shall result through its invocation. . . . He cannot lessen
the quantity of water, seriously impair its quality, or impede its natural flow, to the
detriment of others who have acquired legal rights therein superior to his; and he must
respond in proper actions for all injuries resulting to them by reason of his acts in the
premises.
Id at 617, 9 P. at 796.
26. Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 96 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024 (1934).
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water he receives;2 7 the other is that an appropriator has a right to receive
water of a quality which existed at the time of his appropriation.
28
These two water quality protections are codified in the Water Right
Determination and Administration Act of 1969 [hereinafter "Water Act"].
29
The relevant sections state that a senior appropriator has a right to receive
water of a quality which he has historically put to beneficial use30 and that
upstream storage is a right conditioned on the requirement that the substi-
tuted water be of a quality to meet a senior downstream appropriator's nor-
mal use.
3 '
Even if the impairment in quality is caused by a preferred user, 32 he
must compensate the downstream appropriator.33 The senior's rights are
not subsumed by the fact that the change is of a greater benefit to the public
than his use-his quality rights are still protected.
34
IV. THE REQUIREMENT OF BENEFICIAL USE
An essential element of the right to appropriate water is the require-
ment that the water so appropriated be put to a beneficial use. 35 This ele-
ment has been a condition since one of the earliest cases recognizing the
appropriation doctrine in Colorado, Coffin v. Left Hand Dtch Co. 3 6 Later, the
Colorado Constitution explicitly included the beneficial use requirement.
3 7
27. " '[Pjollution' means an impairment, with attendant injury, to the use of the water that
plaintiffs are entitled to make . . . . In reality, the thing forbidden is the injury." Id. at 331, 44
P.2d at 1029. Accord, Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507 (1874); Hallenbeck v. Granby
Ditch & Reservoir Co., 160 Colo. 555, 420 P.2d 419 (1966); Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co.
v. San Miguel Consolidated Mining & Milling Co., 9 Colo. App. 407, 48 P. 828 (1897).
28. Farmers Hightine Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d
629 (1954); Vogel v. Minnesota Canal & Reservoir Co., 47 Colo. 534, 107 P. 1108 (1910) (which
also extended the right to water quality to junior appropriators).
[A] junior appropriator of water to a beneficial use has a vested right, as against his
senior, in a continuation of the conditions on the stream as they existed at the time he
made his appropriation. If this means anything, it is that when the junior appropria-
tor makes his appropriation he acquires a vested right in the conditions then prevail-
ing upon the stream, and surrounding the general method of use of water therefrom.
Id at 541, 107 P. at I111.
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) (1973). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80-120(3).
30. Id § 37-80-120(3).
31. Id. § 37-92-305(5).
32. COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.
33. Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 264 P.2d 502 (1953); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908); Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co.,
23 Colo. 233, 48 P. 532 (1896). "[Preferred use] is subject to that other constitutional provision
requiring just compensation to those whose rights are affected thereby." Id at 237, 48 P. at 534.
34. Hallenbeck v. Granby Ditch & Reservoir Co., 160 Colo. 555, 420 P.2d 419 (1966).
[An upstream appropriator storing water and causing injury to the downstream user
cannot use the argument that] the right that is to be changed is proportionately of a
greater benefit to the senior than is the detriment to the junior, for the vested property
rights of the junior appropriator include the right to have the conditions remain as
they were when he obtained his appropriation.
Id at 569, 420 P.2d at 427.
35. People v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 57 P.2d 894 (1936); Farmers' High Line Canal &
Reservoir Co. v. Southworth, 13 Colo. 111, 21 P. 1028 (1889); Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530
(1883). See Note, A Surv of Colorado Water Law 47 DEN. L.J. 226, 237-39 (1970).
36. 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
37. "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses
shall never be denied." COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. See CoLAO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)
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Defining beneficial use has proven as elusive as defining quality. 38 The
Colorado Constitution recognizes several uses of water as beneficial-domes-
tic, agricultural, and manufacturing. 39 Court decisions later added uses
such as watering trees and grass, 40 and statutory enactments have added
recreational purposes. 4 1 Other than the above vague categories, there is no
specific list including all those applications considered beneficial.
42
There are, however, certain characteristics of beneficial use which Colo-
rado courts have recognized. The most basic is that a failure to continue
beneficial application of appropriated water will cause a loss of the appropri-
ation right.43 A corollary is that there is no right to appropriate more water
than can be beneficially applied; only the amount of water reasonably neces-
sary for the intended beneficial use is allowed.
44
The Water Act defines beneficial use as that amount of water reason-
ably necessary to accomplish the intended purpose of the appropriation,
with consideration given to the special circumstances and reasonably effi-
cient practices of each case.
4 5
The necessity of efficient and economic use of appropriated water has
not been limited to methods employed on land to which the water is applied.
Colorado courts have expanded this requirement to include the manner uti-
lized for conveyance of the water from the point of diversion to the point of
application. In Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co.,46 an attempt by
a municipality to divert water for domestic purposes was opposed by a
downstream prior appropriator. The court stated that water was too valua-
ble to be wasted by either an inefficient application at the point of use or an
inefficient method of conveyance when this loss could be averted by reason-
able diligence.
4 7
(1973), which states: " 'Appropriation' means the application of a certain portion of the waters
of the state to a beneficial use."
38. City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939), "The term
'beneficial use' is not defined in the Constitution. What is beneficial use, after al, is a question
of fact and depends upon the circumstances in each case." Id at 204, 96 P.2d at 842.
39. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
40. City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 209, 96 P.2d 836, 844 (1939).
41. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4), which states, "'Beneficial use'.., includes the im-
poundment of water for recreational purposes .... "
42. The problems created by lack of specific beneficial use standards is discussed in Carl-
son, Report to CovernorJohn A. Love on Certain Colorado Water Law Problems, 50 DEN. L.J. 293 (1973).
"The existing water law of Colorado does not recognize the possibility that appropriators may
seek to develop water rights which, although beneficial uses under existing law, are nonetheless
socially undesirable for the public at large." Id at 324. This problem manifested itself in the
instant case. See notes 79, 80 & 81 infra.
43. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-402(2)0) (1973). See Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.
v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co., 108 Colo. 482, 120 P.2d 196 (1941).
44. Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120 Colo. 423, 210
P.2d 982 (1949). "The time during which water may be diverted thereunder is measured by the
reasonable needs of the land, and when the water is not so needed, it may no longer rightfully
be diverted from the stream, but must be left therein for use of subsequent appropriators." Id
at 428-29, 210 P.2d at 984-85. Accord, Snow v. Abalos, 18 N.M. 681, 140 P. 1044 (1914).
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1973).
46. 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908).
47. It is a matter of common knowledge that in . . . [conveying the water in the
manner proposed by the city] necessarily a very great proportion of such volume
would be lost by seepage and evaporation before it was conveyed any considerable
19791
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An extension of the requirement that the means used to convey water
be reasonably efficient occurred in City of Colorado Springs V. Bender.48 Colo-
rado Springs had dug wells and appropriated water from an underground
aquifer above the senior appropriator, Bender. This caused the water table
to drop to a point below the capacity of Bender's pumps, thereby cutting off
his water supply. In denying Bender's plea for an injunction against Colo-
rado Springs, the court found that Bender's wells were so shallow that they
constituted an inefficient method of diversion. Bender's request was, in ef-
fect, an attempt to control the entire underground aquifer to protect his inef-
ficient diversion. The court held that no senior appropriator had this
right.
49
An earlier Colorado case, Empire Water and Power Co. v. Cascade Town
Co., 50 recognized the right of an appropriator to take advantage of the
natural flow of a stream as a beneficial use, but it limited this right to an
efficient application. Cascade had constructed a resort to take advantage of
a beautiful, luxuriant plant growth caused by the spray of a waterfall on
Cascade Creek. Empire began to divert the creek above the falls, causing a
significant lessening of the flow reaching the falls, with a consequent deterio-
ration of the plant life. Although recognizing that beneficial application of
water for an intended use did not require construction of man-made diver-
sions, the court held the application by nature had to be efficient, and re-
manded the case for further hearing.
Colorado statutes also recognize the need for efficient diversions, by re-
quiring appropriators using ditches to keep them in a state of repair that will
prevent unnecessary loss through overflow or seepage. 5'
V. THE EVOLUTION OF MAXIMUM UTILIZATION
The doctrine of maximum utilization is a natural outgrowth of benefi-
cial use. The Colorado Constitution implicitly recognizes the need for water
to be applied so that it will produce the best and highest benefits for the
greatest number of people through: (1) the recognition that all water not
appropriated is the people's and for their benefit, 52 and (2) the establishment
distance. The law contemplates an economical use of water .... Water is too valua-
ble to be wasted, either through an extravagant application for the purpose appropri-
ated or by waste resulting from the means employed to carry it to the place of use,
which can be avoided by the exercise of a reasonable degree of care to prevent unnec-
essary loss, or loss of a volume which is greatly disproportionate to that actually con-
sumed.
Id. at 429-30, 94 P. at 341. Accord, Glen Dale Ranches Inc. v. Shaub, 94 Idaho 585, 494 P.2d
1029 (1972).
48. 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552 (1961).
49. [Elach diverter must establish some reasonable means of effectuating his diversion.
He is not entitled to command the whole or a substantial flow of the stream merely to
facilitate his taking the fraction of the whole flow to which he is entitled . ...
[P]riority of appropriation does not give a right to an inefficient means of diversion
Id at 462, 366 P.2d at 555.
50. 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
51. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-84-107-119 (1973).
52. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
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of the preference system.5 3 Article XVI, section 6, provides that when a
conflict of use occurs, domestic application of water will be preferred over
agricultural use, and agricultural will be preferred to manufacturing activi-
ties.54 This preference system reflected a realization by the lawmakers that
some water uses are more beneficial for more people than others. Unfortu-
nately, later court decisions limited this policy to the right to condemn and
pay for the taking of a lower use.55 Nevertheless, the first expression of what
would later become maximum utilization had been made.
Though the doctrine of maximum utilization remained in an inchoate
state for many years, court decisions concerning beneficial use and limiting
wasteful or inefficient application 56 were a recognition that the water in Col-
orado should be developed in the best interests of all the people of the
state.
57
An extensive discussion of the concept of maximum utilization comes
from several law review articles written in the mid- 1960's by Professor Frank
J. Trelease, then of the University of Wyoming Law School. 58 In these arti-
cles, Trelease states that Western water should be shifted to more efficient
uses in order to accomodate the rapidly increasing population of Western
states.59 Trelease's suggested method of shifting the water uses to more effi-
cient, productive uses is to encourage free marketability of water rights; the
most economically desirable uses of water will cause private interest to buy
out less beneficial applications.60 Government regulation would be used
only where private interests were not promoting public welfare, and only on
the condition that the less desirable use be condemned and the prior appro-
priator compensated. 6 ' The purpose is to shift to more beneficial uses with-
53. Id §6.
54. Id For an interesting and revealing history of the conflicts concerning which uses were
to have priority during the constitutional convention of 1876, see COLORADO WATER STUDY,
DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE, The Current Legal System, 11-9 to -14 (Colo. Dept. of Nat. Res.,
publication forthcoming). See also Trelease, Preferences to the Use of Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. L.
REV. 133 (1955).
55. Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 264 P.2d 502 (1953); Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908); Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co.,
23 Colo. 233, 48 P. 532 (1896). See Thomas, Appropriations of Waterfor a Preferred Purpose, 22
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 422 (1950).
56. See notes 44, 47, 49, & 50 supra.
57. Suffolk Gold Mining and Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consolidated Mining and Milling
Co., 407, 48 P. 828 (1897). "[T]he title to the waters of the state always remains, in a measura-
ble sense, in the people . . . . The appropriator may acquire title, but that title is necessarily
subject to many conditions." Id at 412, 48 P. at 830. Seegenerally G. RADOSEVICH, K. NOBE,
D. ALLARDICE, & C. KIRKWOOD, EVOLUTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF COLORADO WATER
LAW, 1876-1976 (1976).
58. Trelease, supra note 4; Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress-Case Studies in the Transfer of
Water Rights, I LAND AND WATER REV. 1 (1966). See also Danielson, Water Admiutration in
Colorado--Higher-iorit or Pnority, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 293 (1958); Milliman, Water Law and
Private Decision-Making," A Critique, 2 J. OF L. & ECON. 41 (1959).
59. Trelease, supra note 4, at 4. See Fox, Water- Supply, Demand and the Law, 32 ROCKY
MTN. L. REV. 452 (1960).
60. Trelease, supra note 4, at 2.
61. Id at 4, 30. Contra, Carlson, supra note 42 at 341: "One approach . . . would be to
treat existing uses in the way that nonconforming uses are treated in zoning law. In this way,
undesirable existing uses might be phased out over a period of time without the necessity of
payment of compensation arising."
1979]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
out injuring prior appropriators. 62
The first Colorado court decision to refer to maximum utilization was
Fellhauer v. People.63 This was an action by a prior appropriator to enjoin the
state engineer from shutting off the appropriator's wells. Fellhauer claimed
this was a violation of due process and a taking of his property. Although
the court upheld his request because of the lack of an established method by
which the state engineer could decide whose water to shut off, the court
warned that the time had come to recognize maximum utilization as a neces-
sary policy to be integrated with the doctrine of prior appropriation. 64 Sub-
sequent decisions applied the doctrine of maximum utilization and upheld
the state engineer's right to issue regulations and limitations on use of under-
ground water.
65
The Colorado legislature officially adopted the concept of maximum
utilization in the Water Act, stating that the policy of water use in Colorado
was maximum utilization of all water available, including an integration of
ground and surface waters.
6 6
VI. PRIOR APROPRIATION COLLIDES WITH MAXIMUM UTILIZATION
An appropriator's right to water quality clashed with the policy of max-
imum utilization in A-B Cattle Co. v. United States. In asserting an impair-
ment of water quality through loss of silt, Bessemer raised a unique
question-Can a junior appropriator be held liable not only for adding pol-
lutants to a stream but also for removing material already in the stream?
67
Prior Colorado cases had dealt only with the addition of pollutants; none
had dealt with the proposition that removing stream materials constituted a
deterioration in quality.
The United States and amicus SECWCD argued that Bessemer had no
right to the silt normally occurring in the Arkansas because: (1) Bessemer's
ditch was inefficient; (2) silt is a pollutant, and if required to provide silt to
downstream users, the United States would be violating state and federal
pollution regulations; and (3) allowing Bessemer a right to silt would effec-
tively prevent any future storage project construction in Colorado.68
62. Trelease, supra note 4, at 4.
63. 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968).
64. Id. at 336, 447 P.2d at 994 (1968):
It is implicit in these constitutional provisions [protecting the rights of appropriators],
that, along with vested righls, there shall be maxi'num utilization of the water of this state.
As administration of water approaches its second century the curtain is opening upon
the new drama of masimum utidization and how constitutionally that doctrine can be
integrated into the law of vested rights.
Id at 336, 447 P.2d at 994 (1968) (emphasis in original).
65. Hall v. Kuiper, 181 Colo. 130, 510 P.2d 329 (1973); Kuiper v. Well Owners Conserva-
tion Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268 (1971).
66. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Colorado that all waters
originating in or flowing into this state, whether found on the surface or underground,
have always been are hereby declared to be the property of the public, dedicated to
the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation and use in accordance with
law.
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1) (1973).
67. Brief for Defendant United States at 3.
68. Id. at 15-31; Brief for Amicus Curaie SECWCD at 14-27.
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In finding that Bessemer had no right to the silt in the Arkansas, the
court based its reasoning on Shodde v. Twin Falls Land and Water Co. 69 In that
case, a downstream appropriator was denied an injunction against upstream
junior diverters who had impaired his use. Shodde had used the current of
the Snake River to drive water wheels which carried his appropriated water
up to his fields, making two uses of the river. By constructing a dam up-
stream of Shodde, the junior appropriators had slowed the current so that it
would no longer drive Shodde's water wheels. Because his means of diversion
was found to be inefficient, his claim was dismissed, the Supreme Court rea-
soning that his wasteful diversion was in effect appropriating the entire flow
of the Snake River.
70
The Colorado Supreme Court found that Bessemer's ditch was ineffi-
cient. Despite the fact that by the method of irrigation used by some of
Bessemer's stockholders, row irrigation, a given amount of water will irrigate
more acreage if it is silty, 7 1 the court further found that Bessemer's request
for silt was an attempt, like Shodde, to appropriate the entire flow of a river in
order to maintain a wasteful method of diversion.7 2 The court cited Fellhauer
v. People to illustrate the need for maximum utilization of Colorado's wa-
ters. 73 The beneficial effects of water storage, which make possible a contin-
uous, dependable flow of water during the late summer months when water
for irrigation and other uses is critical, is an attempt to put the waters of the
Arkansas to maximum use;74 as such, the court elevated the United States'
use above that of Bessemer.
75
69. 224 U.S. 107 (1912).
70. Plaintiff's claim is that the entire Snake River shall be allowed to flow as in a state
of nature, with volume and current undiminished. This is tantamount to a claim . . .
that the entire river has been appropriated by the plaintiff. . . . This claim which is
the basis of plaintiff's asserted cause of action cannot be sustained.
Id at 113.
71. Row irrigation is being used less frequently in favor of more efficient drip and sprinkler
systems. See, e.g., 13 IRRIGATION AGE (Sept. 1978) and C. HOUSE, C. RUSSELL, R. YOUNG, &
W. VAUGHAN, FUTURE WATER DEMANDS (Final Report to the National Water Commission
1971), which found that use of sprinklers saved 30-40% more water than row or flood irrigation.
"Properly operated sprinkler systems can save water by reducing all elements of losses, convey-
ance from the farm water source, deep percolation, and runoff. . . . For lands newly devel-
oped for irrigation, sprinklers are a common choice. ... Id. at 97. Sediment is particulary
damaging to these more modern systems, clogging intake and distribution devices. See Proceed-
ings of the Second Drip Irrigation Congress (Lib. of Cong. Catalog Card No. 74-15261, 1974).
72. 589 P.2d at 61.
73. Id at 60-61.
74. Id at 61. Many Colorado court decisions have recognized the need for storage projects
to insure a dependable supply of water. See, e.g., People v. Hinderlider, 98 Colo. 505, 515, 57
P.2d 894, 898 (1936), where the court stated, "The storage of water to insure dependable, con-
tinuous use has always been encouraged by Colorado courts." Accord, Hill v. District Court, 134
Colo. 369, 304 P.2d 888 (1956); Larimer County Reservoir Co. v. People, 8 Colo. 614, 9 P. 794
(1886); Cushman v. Highland Ditch Co., 3 Colo. App. 437, 33 P. 344 (1893).
75. 589 P.2d at 61.
In using its leaky ditches the Bessemer Co. has not attempted to make maximum
utilization of the water. . . . [Pilaintiffs do not have the right to use silt content to
help seal leaky ditches. To view it otherwise would run contra to a basic principle of
western irrigation that conservation and maximum usage demand the storage of water
in times of plenty for the use in times of drought.
1979]
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VI. IMPACT ON COLORADO WATER LAW
The majority in this case characterized Bessemer's ditch as inefficient.
This appears to be a mistake of cause for effect. Bessemer's ditch was reason-
ably efficient until the construction of Pueblo Dam. As Bessemer claimed,
the court was "putting the cart before the horse." 76 Bessemer's use of the silt
to seal its ditch, though fortuitous, was a beneficial application.
77
However, Bessemer's original applications for appropriation rights did
not include an intention to use the silt in the Arkansas to seal its ditch or
extend its use in the fields. That this occurred was fortunate for Bessemer,
but it did not necessarily give Bessemer a property right to the silt.78 In
addition, though not mentioned by the court, a finding that Bessemer had a
right to silt would have placed the United States and SECWCD in an unten-
able position, for they would have been required, in effect to release a statu-
torily defined pollutant in direct violation of state and national water
pollution laws.
79
The point on which the case turned, though, seemed to be on a weigh-
ing of beneficial uses.8 0 Bessemer's use of the silt-laden water of the Arkan-
sas had been beneficial. The storage of water by the United States was also
beneficial. But a finding against the United States would have jeopardized
all future storage projects in Colorado at a time when storage of water has
become critical not only to sustain population growth but also to maintain
current water uses.
8 1
76. Reply Brief for Plaintiff Bessemer at 25. Accord, Middlekamp v. Bessemer Irrigation
Ditch Co., 46 Colo. 102, 103 P. 280 (1909); City of Combs v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 17 Colo.
146, 28 P. 966 (1892).
77. Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
78. Most Colorado court decisions have conditioned a decree recognizing appropriation
rights not only on a beneficial application, but also on an intent to apply the water for that
specific purpose. See, e.g., Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960);
Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
79. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-8-101 to -612; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (b) (1976).
80. G. RADOSEVICH, K. NOBE, R. MEEK, & J. FLACK, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL
ASPECTS OF COLORADO WATER LAW (OWRR project No. A-013-COLO, Feb. 1, 1973).
[Tihe water resource system in Colorado is being increasingly placed under extreme
stress. The goal of providing adequate supplies of useable water to meet the rapidly
growing domestic, industrial, and recreational needs within the state and maintaining
adequate supplies to support traditional agricultural uses is becoming ever more diffi-
cult and costly to achieve. Means must be found to maximize the efficient utilization
of the limited water resources of the state if a water crisis is to be averted.
Id at 7-8. See also REVIEW DRAFT, PROPOSED REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WATER COMMIS-
SION (Wash. D.C., Nov. 1972), which recommends lining ditches and increased construction of
dams and reservoirs to prevent water waste:
A higher degree of efficiency can be realized through storage facilities where waters
controlled by direct flow rights can be impounded and later released on call so that the
irrigator receives the amount of water to which he is entitled at the time needed and
not at some other time. This has significant advantage over direct flow withdrawals
where the amount diverted under direct flow rights might be excessive to the needs of
one moment and deficient at other times.
Id at 7-166.
81. See Trelease, The Concept of Reasonable Benefxzal Use in the Law of Surface Streams, 12 Wyo.
L.J. 1 (1957).
[T]here are few absolutes on this list [of beneficial uses] . . . .When one [appropria-
tion applicant] urged that the other's use was not beneficial, he was usually relying
upon the often inarticulate premise that it was not beneficial because his use was more
beneficial. Therefore, most of the cases did actually amount to a choice by the courts
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1979] MAXIMUM UTILIZATION
The conflict in this case was really between two incompatible water use
doctrines. Prior appropriation seeks to protect private property rights in in-
dividuals; maximum utilization contemplates regulation of water use so that
the best interests of the people as a whole are protected and developed. The
hope expressed by Justice Groves in Fel/hauer v. People that the two doctrines
could be integrated is not possible. 82 It will be necessary to further restrict
and modify the prior appropriation doctrine in the future so that Colorado
can keep up with the increasingly complex demands of an expanding popu-
lation.83 Colorado's legislative, administrative, and judicial bodies must
more adequately define beneficial use, establish more efficient methods of
determining which uses are more valuable to the state, and provide processes
which implement the transfer of water rights to those more beneficial uses
without causing undue injury to the rights of prior appropriators.
In the early days of Colorado's history, prior appropriation was essential
to encourage settlement and development of resources. But Colorado's
needs today are for management and conservation. 8 4 It is time for a change.
Stephen M Brown
between one use over another, but analysis of the cases in these terms is generally
impossible because that is not the way the courts talked about them. But as competi-
tion for the supply grew fiercer, and as the realization grew upon the courts and legis-
latures that the allocation of water involved a problem in the conservation of natural
resources, new concepts evolved, that each use must not only be beneficial in the ab-
stract sense, but must also be a reasonable and economic use in the light of other
demands for the little water remaining to be allocated.
Id. at 14-15.
82. See note 65, supra.
83. See discussion of establishing zoning type restrictions on water use to gradually elimi-
nate inefficient uses in note 61, supra; Carlson, Has the Doctrine of Appropriation Outlhved Its Usful-
ness?, 19 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 529 (1974).
Prior appropriation grants claimants private property rights on a first come, first
served basis. Maximum utilization, on the other hand, would appear to involve a
sharing of water resources among senior and junior users to foster intensive and effi-
cient use of water for the overall benefit of the state. It is not a quantity of use concept
but one of quality of use. Maximum utilization would appear to involve an analysis as
to the best means and pattern of allocation for the state and its people. Such a con-
cept does not lend itself to a system designed to protect private property in water,
where the protection of vested rights is the paramount concern.
Id at 537. Accord, Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 176 Colo. 119, 490 P.2d 268
(1971), in which the court upheld the regulations on underground water use promulgated by
the state engineer as a result of the decision in Fellhauer and the enactment of the "Water Right
Determination Act of 1969", and stated:
[T]here is a slight indication of a feeling upon the part of the plaintiffs and on the part
of the trial court that changes should not be required in the operation of wells on the
Platte River. There must be change, and courts, legislators, the State Engineer and
users must recognize it.
Id at 150, 490 P.2d at 283.
84. For specific suggestions for implementing various changes in the prior appropriation
doctrine, see Recommendations 7-26 to 7-35, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE (Report of the
National Water Commission, 1973).

